The Unions and the Democrats: An Enduring Alliance
Journal of Labor Research; Fairfax; Winter 2001
Ithaca, NX: Cornell University Press, 1999, 233 pp.
The Democratic Party and unions enjoy a symbiotic relationship. The latter help the former in two ways. First, unions assist Democrats in their election efforts by mobilizing the rank and file to vote for the candidate or by providing money or workers for a campaign. Second, unions help the Democratic leadership, either in Congress or a president, pass their agenda. Thus, organized labor can attempt to alter legislative outcomes by mobilizing grass roots support for or opposition to a legislative proposal. By prompting its members to contact their representatives to express their views on legislation, unions may influence the signals these politicians receive from their constituents. This is important since these legislators may change their votes in response to perceived constituent preferences. Also, when unions buy roll call votes on relevant legislation with campaign contributions, they may increase the chance that favorable legislation will pass.
Unions also benefit from this relationship. Politicians can provide these associations with legislation that helps them to perform their core job. These statutes can make it easier for unions to organize workers. Similarly, new laws can increase a brotherhood's collective bargaining power. Politicians also provide liberal legislation which unions value highly even though they know it benefits many workers, not just their own members. Family leave legislation is an example.
The mutually beneficial exchange between unions and Democratic politicians faces hurdles that private sector transactions do not encounter. In a private market, property rights are usually clearly defined. For example, one person may trade a book for cash. In this case the first person clearly owns the book and the second clearly owns the cash. Because ownership is predetermined, if the two people agree on a transaction, they can simply engage in trade. In the public sector, exchanges are much more difficult because ownership is not so clearly defined. For example, the president cannot implement law himself. For a bill to become law both congressional chambers must pass it. For the statute to remain in effect, the courts have to resist striking it down. The president cannot always guarantee that the other branches of government will act as he wishes. So while he may want to trade legislation to a union for political support, he may not always be able to do so. Likewise organized labor's leaders do not always speak for their members. Union presidents cannot guarantee the vote of the rank and file. So while union negotiators may wish to exchange support for legislation, they may not be able to guarantee support at the polls.
In Unions and Democrats, Taylor Dark seeks to shed light on how inexact property rights alter the exchange between unions and Democratic politicians. He starts off by noting that in this political exchange, none of the principal negotiators can offer a product unless he gets several other principals on board. In chapter two Dark presents his main hypothesis which explores the implications of bargainers not being in control of the product they sell. His thesis is that when both political power and the union movement are centralized, more productive exchange is possible. With fewer people needed to keep an agreement, more promises will be kept and a higher trust relationship will develop which, in turn, will foster an even more productive trading environment. The opposite occurs when union or political power is dispersed. Not everyone necessary to deliver a policy will be at the bargaining table - simply because the number of important decision makers is too large for effective negotiation. If the principal bargainers promise something, they may not be able to deliver it because the cooperation of so many other people is required. Either promises will not be made because they cannot be kept, or promises will be made that cannot be kept. Broken promises will foster suspicion and a low trust atmosphere which will reduce the effectiveness of the working relationship between the negotiators.
The remaining chapters explore how various degrees of centralization in both the Democratic party and the labor movement influence the exchange between politicians and unions. His analysis starts with the Johnson administration and runs through the Clinton presidency. Chapter three discusses the Johnson era, the high-water mark of productive political exchanges. Political power was very concentrated because Johnson was a strong effective leader, and the AFLCIO was a virtual autocracy under George Meany. These two men developed a close working relationship and cooperated on such topics as civil rights, medicare, and aid to education. However, there is a limit to the centralization of federal government decision making. Johnson did not control Republicans, and he was often at odds with Southern Democrats. Additionally, Senate rules allowed a minority to prevent reforms they disliked. Because of Johnson's incomplete control over government decision making, unions did not receive some of the labor legislation they sought, e.g., the repeal of section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act. Also, the administration could not stop states from passing Right-to-Work laws which outlawed union shops. However, considered as a whole, the Johnson administration was probably the most centralized Democratic government and thus offered unions the most favorable bargaining conditions.
Chapter four considers the years 1968-1976, during which the Democratic party decentralized. First, they lost the presidency and the unifying power the position brings with it. Second, congressional reforms took power away from a few committee chairmen and spread it out so that subcommittee chairmen became more powerful. Also, the number of Democratic primaries increased. Politicians could now take their campaigns more directly to voters, cutting out the union middle man. This change reduced the AFL-CIO's position as a power broker and removed one of the goods they had to trade in the political market.
Chapter 5 covers the Carter years. Carter, a Democratic president, offered unions the hope that he could further centralize the party and increase its ability to make political exchanges. However, he never developed a cordial relationship with Meany, like Johnson had. Carter ran a campaign that directly communicated with the voters through the mass media. He did not need labor as an intermediary as much as his predecessors. Also, Carter did not consult Meany who pointedly demanded a meeting with the president in 1978, but Carter refused to accommodate him. Meany's privileged access to Democratic presidents was a great source of his power. Carter, by meeting with independent union leaders, instead of Meany, decentralized the bargaining apparatus used by AFL-CIO member unions and prevented meaningful political exchange during this period. Unions wanted national health care and the Labor Law Reform Bill of 1978. They got neither. Carter chose to put his political capital behind the the Panama Canal bill instead. The labor movement blamed his choice of priorities for the defeat of the 1978 bill. Carter's inability to deliver on his pledges made unions unwilling to work with him later on when he asked them to cooperate on voluntary wage and price guidelines to control inflation.
When Reagan became president, unions became concerned because he was overtly hostile to their aims. Chapter 6 examines how during this period organized labor sought to increase its political clout. The AFL-CIO established a public works committee charged with formulating a long-term political strategy. In 1984, the AFL-CIO broke with longstanding tradition and backed a candidate in the Democratic primaries. They sought to use their resources early on to assure a nominee with whom they could work. Chapter 7 illustrates how labor and Democratic Congressmen became more centralized during the Reagan/Bush years and further highlights how they worked more closely together during this period. In Congress, Jim Wright used the influence of Speaker to consolidate power. On the union front, the Teamsters, after 20 years of being non-affiliated, joined the AFL-CIO. The Democratic congressional leadership shared information with the AFL-CIO concerning which candidates were wavering on a bill. The union would target these fence sitters in their lobbying efforts. This increased centralization and cooperation produced results. Unions were able to stop most of the hostile Reagan initiatives and pass some legislation over the president's veto, such as the 60-day notice requirement for plant closings.
The final chapter looks at the Clinton administration. While Clinton offered unions little in the way of legislation, he did make favorable appointments to the National Labor Relations Board, and he allowed its leadership a great deal of access.
All in all, Dark's book is very readable. It provides a broad sweeping overview of the relationship between the Democratic party and unions. Its central hypothesis is interesting and probably correct. However, the book does have some shortcomings. First, the goods being traded are hard to measure and Dark does not adequately address this problem. For example, comparing legislative success rates over time is problematic. He explores the legislative history of only a few bills in each of the time periods he analyzes. However, unions do not value all statutes equally. Some account should be taken of the value organized labor places on a piece of legislation. Second, Dark makes no mention of how legislative successes match the AFL-CIO's agenda. Getting two low-priority bills passed may or may not be as satisfying as having success with one important one.
Third, the AFL-CIO's largest recent growth has been with public sector employees. Its agenda should change over time to reflect this and the type of bill that the AFL-CIO cares about will change in response to these alterations. Dark makes no effort to account for the AFL-CIO's changing agenda.
Fourth, also lacking is an explanation of why unions are concerned with broad liberal policy agendas. Presumably, they value labor law more highly. A success with a specific labor policy will satisfy unions more than promoting a general liberal policy. The book would have been strengthened if it included a discussion of Olson's The Logic of Collective Action. His byproduct theory and the literature it spawned may have been useful in explaining the importance of broad-based policy to unions.
Finally, Dark does not adequately explain what Democratic politicians get in exchange for their work. There is no discussion of what has happened to the level of campaign support, nor its distribution. I would be interested to know if union support had been spread out more among politicians as political power has become more decentralized. A discussion of how different measures of election-altering union resources changed over time would have been useful. For instance, how many workers did the AFL-CIO lend to campaign efforts? How much did they spend on mailing, phone banks, and get-out-the-vote drives? Did these activities vary with changes in the degree of centralization in unions or the Democratic party?
In general Dark's book is a good overview. His broad brush explanations make interesting reading and provide general background for this topic. However, while the book's design prevented Dark from rigorously proving any of his points, it may spur others to take up this task. Scholars may find worthwhile projects in careful empirical examinations of Dark's central hypothesis.
-- Joseph P. McGarrity
University of Central Arkansas